This is Episode 7, "QM and the Mysteries of Delayed Choice and Quantum Eraser," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
This is Episode 6, "Paradoxes of Closed Timelike Curves," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
This is Episode 5, "Inexplicable Initial Conditions of BBC," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
This is Episode 4, "Einstein's Equations of General Relativity as 4D Constraints," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
This is Episode 3, "The Block Universe from Special Relativity," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
This is Episode 2, "Dynamical vs Adynamical Explanation," of the video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge."
In order to explain the main claim of our book for a general audience, I produced a video series, "Beyond the Dynamical Universe: Rising to Wilczek's Challenge." In Episode 1, "Mermin over Smolin: Quantum Mechanics is Right," I introduce the theme of the series and myself, then I provide a definition of physics per Einstein and give Wilczek's challenge.
In this explanation of the Tsirelson bound, we see that both special relativity and quantum mechanics are rooted in "no preferred reference frame." To borrow from Einstein, that means no one's "sense experiences" can evidence a favored perspective on the "real external world." This talk was given at Linnaeus University, Sweden, for the conference, "Quantum Information Revolution: Impact to Foundations?"
I am not sold that the adynamical picture is truly explanatory. Philosophers of science have proposed objective accounts of explanation, but they all recognize there’s a strong sense in which explanation is ‘explanation for us,’ and any account should capture our intuition that explanation is fundamentally dynamical. This is connected with causation: intuitively, we explain an event because we find its causes; causes happen before their effects and ‘bring them about.’
Beyond or Above? The AdynamicalExplanation Meets Ontological Contextuality without a Fundamental Level. Valia Allori (2019).
In this review for the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Karen Crowther shows that she "gets it" in the very first sentence:
Many of the greatest problems in fundamental physics, cosmology, and the philosophy of mind are the result of our taking a biased perspective on the world, and of our seeking a particular type of explanation. These problems could be solved if we were to adopt a different viewpoint and accept an alternative form of explanation. This is the contention of Silberstein, Stuckey, and McDevitt (SSM) in Beyond the Dynamical Universe.
And of course, we appreciate her endorsement in the last sentence:
Beyond the Dynamical Universe has the ambitious goal of introducing a complete world-view and demonstrating how it could potentially solve many of the biggest problems across a range of disciplines, while remaining accessible even to advanced undergraduates. It does an impressive job of achieving this. Yet, what makes the work exceptionally valuable is its openness—it offers a stimulating perspective on the world and encourages the reader to be involved in exploring it.
We should acknowledge that Karen did actually supply the name of the book as an initial reviewer. The tentative title was End of the Mechanical Universe, but she rightfully pointed out that people would assume this was just another popular book about Newtonian mechanics being superseded by modern physics. She then suggested the title we have now.
This statement and her slogan sums up our idea nicely:
From this NSU perspective, even if we discover some fundamental laws, or a ‘theory of everything’, not only would we be left asking, ‘why these laws rather than some other ones?’, but we would also be beleaguered by the initial conditions of the universe at the Big Bang, defying dynamical explanation in terms of any ‘prior state’. Instead, from the LSU perspective, ‘there is nothing particularly mysterious or sacred about the initial conditions at the Big Bang […] because the conditions at any point in spacetime globally constrain the conditions at the other points of spacetime’ (p. 102). The character of the explanation thus shifts and can be captured by the slogan ‘everything is the way it is because everything is the way it is’, in accordance with the adynamical global constraint (note: slogan coined by me, not SSM).
Micheal David Silberstein